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EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT  
OVER NATURAL RESOURCES  
Abstract 
 
Throughout the world, ethnic, racial and religious conflicts over limited resources persist 
in the face of potential settlements that plainly serve the interests of all sides.  When analyzing 
such conflict, economists tend to ignore “non-material” aspects of decision-making such as inter- 
and intra-cultural relationships.  Such aspects are typically analyzed by sociologists, 
anthropologists, and political scientists.  Using an experimental approach, we demonstrate that 
economists can indeed make a contribution to understanding the way in which cultural 
relationships affect economic behavior.   Specifically, we examine how the ethnic mix of 
experimental bargaining sessions affects economic outcomes.  Using subjects from two 
ethnicities that co-exist in an industrialized society, the Hispanic and Navajo cultures in the 
southwestern United States, we present clear evidence that subjects of different cultures behave 
differently and that their behavior is affected by interactions with individuals from another 
culture.  Our experimental framework offers the potential to gain insights into the allocation of 
natural resources in societies of mixed ethnicity, race and religion. 
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Experimental Approaches to  
Understanding Conflict over Natural Resources 
I. Introduction 
Throughout the world, ethnic, racial and religious conflicts over limited resources persist 
in the face of potential settlements that plainly serve the interests of all sides.  For example, in 
many parts of the world, there is conflict and tensions over the allocation of scarce freshwater 
resources (Gleick 1998). Environmental economists have generally left the study of such 
conflicts to sociologists, political scientists and anthropologists.   
Research in these other disciplines has highlighted the role that cultural differences 
among competing groups can have in determining environmental outcomes.  In summarizing the 
main thrust of this area of research, Adams et al. (2003) argue that  
“[a]lthough conflict is a feature of many resource management regimes, it is often 
assumed to reflect differences in material interests between stakeholders….Conflicts 
over the management of common pool resources are not simply material….and the 
origins of conflict go beyond material incompatibilities.  They arise at a deeper 
cognitive level….One cannot, therefore, simply analyze the economic interests of 
different claimants to rights over a defined resource.  Different people will see 
different resources in a landscape.”  
Kim (2003), a political scientist analyzing a conservation and development project in 
Korea, argues that conflicts can be “culturally constructed” and difficult to resolve because of the 
way in which interacting cultures frame the resource dilemmas in which they are playing.  In a 
recent edited volume on local-level environmental outcomes, Agrawal and Gibson (2001: 15) 
emphasize that explicitly considering the heterogeneity of communities along gender and ethnic 
lines (“differentiated relations of community actors”) is one “of the most important issues 
confronting the research and practice of local-level conservation efforts.” Of the eleven authors 
in the edited volume, none are economists.   
The absence of economists in this area of research is unfortunate.  By building on 
advances in behavioral economics and experimental methods, economists can make important 
contributions to our understanding of the ways in which “culture” affects economic decision-
making.  Through a combination of simple economic theory and experimental methods, we offer 
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a demonstration of how economists can contribute to knowledge about the role of cultural 
diversity and conflict in competition and cooperation over environmental resources. 
We are not the first economists to explore the role of culture in economic decision-
making.  Some authors have focused on cross-cultural differences in behavior (e.g., Brandts et 
al., 2004; Henrich, 2000; Croson and Buchan, 1999; Burlando and Hey, 1997; Roth et al. 1991).  
In particular, an initiative to explore the effect of culture in 15 small-scale societies across the 
globe has found striking variability in the outcomes of economic experiments (Henrich et al., 
2001, 2003). 
In another area of research, a controversial empirical literature has developed over the 
role that cultural diversity may play in explaining cross-national or cross-regional differences in 
economic outcomes.  Some authors (e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 2003) find that 
there is an inverse relationship between economic growth and cultural diversity, while others 
(e.g., Collier 2001; Fearon 2003) contest this conclusion. Other authors (e.g., Alesina et al. 1997; 
Miguel 1999) find that cultural diversity is an important determinant of local public finances.  In 
particular, they find an inverse relationship between diversity and spending on public goods such 
as education, roads and sewers, which they attribute to majority cultures reacting to the size of 
minority groups.   
Our paper provides an experimental framework that can tie together these disparate 
literatures and help economists move toward a synthesis of the effects that “culture” has on 
economic behavior and outcomes.  To illustrate the use and potential of this experimental 
framework, we organized experimental sessions of a simple bargaining game with members of 
two cultural groups from New Mexico:  Navajo Indians and Hispanic Americans. We varied the 
cultural mix of our experimental sessions in order to infer the effect of inter-cultural interactions 
on economic behavior.  In the next section, we define what we mean by “culture” and describe 
the way in which our study builds on previous experimental research. In Section III, we describe 
the design of our experiments. Results are reported in sections IV and V and, in Section VI, we 
present a simulation based on these results. Concluding remarks are offered in section VII. 
II. Culture, Ethnicity and Race 
Our experiments were conducted in Albuquerque, New Mexico, during July 2002.  New 
Mexico is arguably the most unique state in the U.S. in terms of ethnic diversity, with three 
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major ethnic groups each accounting for a sizable proportion of the population.  In 2001, New 
Mexico’s population was 42.1% Hispanic, 45% Anglo, and 10% Native American, with Blacks 
and Asians accounting for the remaining 2.9%.1  New Mexico has a higher Hispanic population, 
in terms of percentage of total population, than any other state in the U.S.  Other states have a 
higher proportion of Native Americans, but no other state has a mix of Anglos, Hispanics, and 
Native Americans comparable to New Mexico.  Native American and Hispanic cultures are 
distinct and dominant in the state, and in the City of Albuquerque. 
Economists who work with concepts like culture, ethnicity and race rarely attempt to 
define such words.  Their definitions, however, are subject to much debate in other disciplines 
(McElreath et al., 2003).2  We use the word “culture” to refer to the statistical distribution of 
beliefs, values and modes of thinking that shape behavior among a group of people (e.g., notions 
of fairness).  “Ethnicity” is related to symbolically marked groups (e.g., marked by language, 
dialect or clothing).  Cultural differences may be present in a population when ethnicity is not 
marked (e.g., southern-born and northern-born whites in the United States; Nisbett and Cohen, 
1996).  Similarly, ethnic differences may exist when no cultural differences exist (except for the 
ethnic marking).  “Race” is like ethnicity, except the “markers” are genetically transmitted (Gil-
White, 2001). 
We assume that self-reported Navajo and Hispanic individuals in our experiments are 
distinct culturally, ethnically and racially.  We are testing whether such distinctions make any 
difference in the bargaining behavior of our subjects.  In our experiment, we cannot differentiate 
the separate effects of culture, ethnicity and race; empirically, they are identical for our purposes.  
Thus we will use the term “cultural differences” to describe any differences that result from 
differences in culture, ethnicity or race.  As in previous papers that find relationships between an 
individual’s culture, ethnicity or race and his or her behavior or economic status, we can never be 
certain that what we describe as cultural determinants are not actually non-cultural determinants, 
for which we have no data, that are correlated with our cultural categories.  In this sense, what 
we call “culture” in our analysis is best viewed as a residual category.  By controlling for 
differences in behavior that stem from variability in the socio-economic attributes of our 
1 Department of Commerce website: Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 2001, Washington, DC, Tables 23 and 24. 
2 The authors thank anthropologist Joseph Henrich (Emory University) for helping us to come to grips with these 
terms and directing us to the relevant literature. 
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subjects, we attribute to “cultural differences” any remaining variability in behavior across ethnic 
groups.   
As mentioned above, experimental economists have generally ignored the question, “Do 
individuals interacting with others sharing the same culture behave differently than when 
interacting with others from a different culture?” We find only two published studies that address 
the inter-cultural question:  Fershtman and Gneezy (2001; hereafter FG) and List (2004).3   
In a series of experiments with two major Israeli ethnic groups, the Ashkenazic Jews 
(European and American immigrants and their Israeli-born offspring) and the Eastern Jews 
(Asian and African immigrants and their Israeli-born offspring), FG addressed the effects of 
ethnic stereotyping on trust and the ability of two players to cooperate.  In their application of the 
Ultimatum Game, FG found significantly larger offers were proposed to Eastern players.4  
However, they found no significant difference between the percent of Eastern and Ashkenazic 
players that rejected a proposed split of 25% of the pie.   
FG write (p. 370) that the observed discrimination “is probably an outcome of a common 
ethnic stereotype in Israeli society, according to which men of Eastern origin are believed to 
react more harshly if treated unfairly.” Absent information about players’ expectations of partner 
responses, however, FG were unable to determine if the observed discrimination derived from 
erroneous statistical discrimination or a “taste for discrimination.”  We return to this issue later in 
our analysis. 
List (2004) examined the bargaining behaviors of participants in a real sportscard market.  
He observed starting and final offers for a specific card and collected information on basic 
attributes of the bargainers (age, experience, gender, education, income, height and weight) and 
the length of the bargaining session.  He had subjects from four categories:  white males aged 20-
30, white females aged 20-30, white males aged 60+, and “nonwhite” males aged 20-30.  Given 
that race was not asked on the questionnaire, it is unclear as to how the author determined race 
and what race, or races, the term “nonwhite” includes for his sample.   
List found that average initial and final offers from dealers to “minority” buyers (females, 
older males, and nonwhite males) were lower than those received by young white males.  After 
3 We note, however, the interesting unpublished study of the ultimatum game with ethnicity manipulation (between 
two Mongolian tribes) by Gil-White (no date). 
4 FG do not make clear whether this discrimination was observed only with Ashkenazic Proposers or both Eastern 
(n=33) and Ashkenazic (n=24) Proposers.   
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controlling for experience, the differences were small for experienced buyers (but minority 
buyers did have to spend more time to obtain a similar outcome) and were only significantly 
different among inexperienced older male and young female buyers.5   Unlike FG, List used 
complementary “laboratory” experiments (Dictator Game, Decentralized Chamberlain Market, 
and a Vickery second-price auction for a real card) to elucidate the underlying reasons for the 
observed discrimination in the real sportscard market.  The data in the complementary 
experiments suggest that the observations in the real sportscard market were a result of statistical 
discrimination by dealers rather than preference-based discrimination. 
Two interrelated issues motivate our analysis below.  First, we wish to ensure that we do 
not attribute to “culture” any differences in behavior that stem from variability in the socio-
economic attributes of our subjects.  For example, FG analyzed only the behavior of the male 
Proposers in their Ultimatum Game and did not analyze rejections controlling for the gender (or 
ethnicity) of the subject making the offer.  Other studies, however, have found significant gender 
effects in the Ultimatum Game (Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Botelho et al., 2002).  
FG also did not control for socio-economic differences across subjects (e.g., Ashkenazic Jews 
tend to be wealthier).  List, in contrast, controls for gender, length of bargaining session, average 
frequency of buyer transactions per month, years of market experience, income, and education.  
Our second motivation relates to common practices used by economists to control for 
subject characteristics, particularly ethnicity, and is relevant whether or not subjects from the two 
cultures behave differently in the Ultimatum Game when each player’s partner is from the same 
culture.  We wish to determine if the ethnic mix of the experimental session affects how subjects 
make decisions.  FG’s inquiry into the existence of inter-cultural discrimination is based on a 
design wherein players attempt to infer the ethnicity of their partners, who are in a different 
location, from the partners’ surnames -- subjects assume they are either playing with a partner of 
the same or a different ethnic group.  In List, subjects can either observe the race, gender, or 
approximate age of their partner or are told these attributes by the experimenter. 
While these may be important contexts, we wish to explore behavioral variability in 
response to changes in the proportional representation of the two ethnic groups in an 
experimental session.  In other words, we wish to determine if subjects behave differently in the 
5 Similar results are presented for the offers made by dealers to minority sellers, but the differences are not 
statistically as meaningful. 
 6
following three contexts:  (1) all players share the subject’s ethnicity, (2) the player’s ethnic 
group makes up a large majority of the players, and (3) the player’s ethnic group is a small 
minority of the players.  If subject behavior is affected by the ethnic mix of a session, several 
considerations arise that are relevant for public policy and for the manner in which economists 
control for ethnicity in empirical analyses.  Public administration often takes place in societies 
characterized by mixed ethnicities, in which one or two ethnicities dominate.  In empirical 
economic analyses, economists commonly use simple dummy (zero-one) variables to control for 
ethnicity, race and religion.  If, however, subject behavior is affected by the cultural mix rather 
than (or in addition to) the subject’s own culture, economists may need to reconsider the way in 
which they control for cultural differences in empirical analyses. 
III. Experiment Design 
We analyze our problem in the simplest of bargaining environments:  the ultimatum 
bargaining game.    Two players, a Proposer and a Responder, bargain over $10.  The Proposer 
offers $x to the Responder, leaving himself $10-x.  The Responder can either take the offer, in 
which case each obtains the proposed split of the $10 pie, or reject it and both get nothing.  As 
noted by Camerer (2003: 8), the ultimatum game is too simple to be a good model of the 
complicated processes of most real-world bargaining.  Yet because it is simple, it offers a useful 
environment for testing hypotheses about the factors that influence how people feel about the 
allocations of money between themselves and others.  It is thus unsurprising that previous cross-
cultural studies and the Fershtman-Gneezy intercultural study have used the Ultimatum Game as 
a vehicle for understanding the way in which culture affects economic behavior.  
The experimental sessions were held in a large room rented at the Menaul School, 
centrally located in Albuquerque.  A portable experimental laboratory was used that consists of   
32 networked notebook computers with wireless connection to a laptop computer that acts as a 
server.  Subject computers are situated in folding partitions to ensure private decisions.  The 
instructions for the experiments were conveyed orally and in writing.  A portable projector 
demonstrated the subject interface (see appendix for instructions).  Prior to each session, subjects 
were placed in a room in which some food and refreshments were offered.  We grouped subjects 
prior to entering the experimental room for two reasons: (1) such grouping allowed subjects to 
observe the ethnic makeup of their session (Navajo and Hispanic subjects are visually very 
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different) and (2) it allowed us to conduct back-to-back sessions without risking cross-session 
observation or communication. 
Sixty Hispanic subjects were recruited by distributing flyers in Hispanic neighborhoods.  
All of our Hispanic subjects were raised in the United States.  Sixty Navajo subjects were 
recruited primarily by distributing flyers at three Navajo organizations:  the Southwest Indian 
Polytechnic Institute (SIPI), the PHS Indian Hospital, and the Albuquerque Indian Center.  
“Navajo neighborhoods” do not exist and these organizations serve as the closest equivalent.  
Overall, 45% of the subject pool was male, 59% reported an annual income of less than $15,000, 
47% of the sample was full- or part-time students, 15% was married and the mean age was 29 
years. 
In order to explore cross-cultural and inter-cultural effects on behavior, we scheduled 
four experimental sessions.  The ethnic composition of each session was as follows:6
Session 1 (All-Hispanic)  30 Hispanic subjects 
Session 2 (Majority-Hispanic) 21 Hispanics subjects and 6 Navajo subjects 
Session 3 (All-Navajo)  29 Navajo subjects and 1 Hispanic subject7
  Session 4 (Majority-Navajo)  23 Navajo subjects and 7 Hispanic subjects. 
6 Only 117 of 120 observations were usable.  Given our concern with offending subjects or the organizations 
providing subjects, we chose to allow subjects to complete the experiment even if they were unable to successfully 
complete practice questions or were demonstrably unable to comprehend questions.  As a result, we exclude data 
from three subjects: one Navajo subject from the All-Navajo session who could not respond to the practice question 
(even after repeated explanations by the experimenter), could not understand how to use the mouse, and rejected 
every possible offer; and one Navajo subject from the All-Navajo session and one Hispanic subject from the 
Majority-Hispanic session, both of whom had obvious difficulty completing the practice question and who then 
clicked reject and accept in alternating fashion for every potential offer that could be sent to them.  For these three 
subjects, the idea of a minimum acceptable offer makes no sense and it is unlikely that these subjects understood the 
main components of the experiment.  We note, however, that including these subjects in the analysis by treating 
their first accepted offers as their Responder reservation prices does not affect our results.  When estimating the 
percentage of Navajo and Hispanic in a session, we include these subjects because they were observable to every 
subject in the room (removing them from the percentage calculation does not affect our results). 
7 Native American ethnicity is a requirement for entry into these organizations.  Thus, presumably all subjects in the 
All-Navajo session were Navajo.  However, one subject selected “Hispanic” on the post-experiment questionnaire.  
We are unsure if the subject was indeed Hispanic, was of mixed heritage and did not see the option for mixed 
ethnicity, or made a mistake filling out the questionnaire, which was completed on a computer.  We treat the subject 
as Hispanic, but note that deleting this subject or re-coding her as “Navajo” does not affect our results. 
 
 
 8
                                                          
Session 1 followed immediately by Session 2 took place on one night, and Session 3 
followed immediately by Session 4 took place the next night. 
 The standard rules of the Ultimatum Game were explained to subjects and subjects were 
required to complete a practice question to ensure they understood how their earnings would be 
calculated (see Davis and Holt (1993) or Roth (1995) for more information on Ultimatum 
Games).  Subjects played the role of both Responder and Proposer (as was done in the original 
application of the Ultimatum Game by Güth et al. (1982) and in more recent studies like 
Andreoni et al. (2003), Carter and Irons (1991), and Kahneman et al. (1986)).  Subjects were 
told that they would make decisions as a Responder and as a Proposer.  At the end of the 
experiment, the computer randomly assigned each subject to the role of Responder or Proposer, 
and randomly paired the subject with another subject in the room (not known to him or her) who 
played the opposite role.  Subjects were cautioned to take each role seriously given the equal 
chance that each person had of being assigned the role of Responder or Proposer.  With the 
exception of the All-Navajo and All-Hispanic sessions, the ethnicity of a subject’s partner was 
uncertain but the ethnic composition of the session was obvious: the subject’s ethnic group 
constituted either a large majority or a small minority of the subjects. 
As an aside, we note that our design differs from FG’s in that subjects from one culture 
interact directly with subjects from the other culture.  The only contact that an Ashkenazic 
subject in FG’s experiment had with an Eastern subject was a visual inspection of the Eastern 
subject’s name on a form.8
The amount of money given to the Proposer, known by all subjects, was $10.00.  
Subjects first saw a screen (Figure 1) that asked them to make the decisions of a Responder.  
They were asked to indicate, for each dollar amount between $0 and $10, if they were assigned 
the role of Responder and if that dollar amount were sent to them, whether they would accept it 
or reject it; i.e., we used the strategy method.  Eliciting the behavior of Responders through the 
strategy method allowed us to collect data on all information sets of the game, not just those that 
were actually reached in the course of the game.   Subjects were cautioned that, if assigned the 
role of Responder, they would be bound by the decisions that they recorded on this screen.  
 
8 In Gil-White’s (no date) experiment, subjects’ viewed photographs of the 20 potential partners. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Responder Screen 
Subjects were then asked to play the role of a Proposer.  To allow us to make inferences 
about discriminatory behavior that may be observed in the laboratory, subjects were first asked 
to predict how they believed Responders would respond to each possible amount that they might 
send to a Responder, from $0 to $10 (Figure 2 below).  Subjects predicted the percent of 
Responders in the session that would accept each amount.  To create incentives for subjects to 
think about their estimates, subjects were informed that the individual whose estimates were the 
closest to the actual percent of Responders accepting each amount would win $10.00.9
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9 More specifically, they were told that the absolute values of the differences between their predicted percentages 
and the actual percentages for each potential offer would be summed.  The subject with the lowest sum wins the 
$10.00.  We do not claim that this method is incentive-compatible (we gratefully acknowledge related comments 
offered by Uri Gneezy).  However, our payment rule is highly transparent and can include truth telling as one best 
response, while a best response that deviates from true beliefs under this rule requires sophisticated strategizing 
about the beliefs of others in the session and mathematical acumen to solve for a best-response conditional on those 
 Figure 2 – Proposer’s Expectations of the Likelihood of Offer Rejection 
Subjects were then asked to decide how much they would send to a Responder if they 
were assigned the role of a Proposer (Figure 3).  Subjects were advised that if assigned the role 
of Proposer, the amount they chose on this screen would be sent to the Responder. 
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beliefs.  Moreover, a recent study by two economists who have published numerous experiments using incentive-
compatible quadratic scoring rules (Sonnemans and Offerman, 2001) found no significant difference between the 
beliefs elicited from a sophisticated quadratic scoring rule that corrects for undesired effects of risk attitudes and 
probability weighting and beliefs elicited from a method that simply pays subjects a fixed (unconditional) payment: 
the offer of some compensation for effort was enough to induce subjects to think carefully about their beliefs. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3 – Proposer’s Screen 
Finally, subjects responded to a questionnaire (Figure 4) that inquired about the 
motivations for the decisions made by the subject as a Responder (Figure 1) and as a Proposer 
(Figure 3).  At the end of the session, demographic information was obtained from each subject.  
The same person conducted all the sessions. 
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 Figure 4 – Post-Experiment Questionnaire of Subject Motivations 
IV. Results – Summary Statistics 
A summary of the results from the four experimental sessions is given in Table 1.  This 
summary shows rough trends in the data.  In the next section (V), we control for demographic 
and other subject characteristics in the analysis.   
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Responders 
We begin by examining the behavior of Responders.  Hispanic Responders have higher 
minimum acceptable offers, on average, than Navajo Responders in all sessions (significant at 
2%-11% level, depending on the session, under Mann-Whitney and t-tests).  In the All-Navajo 
and All-Hispanic sessions, 60% of both ethnicities were willing to accept an offer of 10% of the 
pie ($1).  These acceptance rates are substantially higher than those observed in previous 
Ultimatum Game experiments in industrialized nations.  Güth et al. (2003) report that anything 
over 33% is much higher than the rates typically observed in Ultimatum Game experiments that 
use the strategy method (including experiments in which subjects played both roles).10
Table 1. General Summary of Experiment Results 
                                                           .................... Responder....................      ........Proposer........ 
                                                                 Average                % responders                
                                                           reservation price:       accepting $1.00          Average offer: 
                   Session                           Navajo   Hispanic     Navajo   Hispanic     Navajo   Hispanic
  All subjects same ethnicity  $1.31      $1.83            62%       60%          $3.83      $4.90 
  Subject’s ethnicity is a majority $1.78      $2.73            61%       33%          $5.13      $4.77 
  Subject’s ethnicity is a minority $2.00      $3.38            50%       13%          $4.1711    $4.50 
Furthermore, both Hispanics and Navajos appear to discriminate against the other ethnic 
group -- there is an increase in the minimum offer that they would accept as the relative 
proportion of their ethnic group in the session decreases.  This increase is particularly notable for 
the Hispanics.12  The same pattern appears in the percent of subjects willing to accept an offer of 
one dollar.  Both Hispanics and Navajo become more willing to accept the one-dollar offer as the 
                                                          
10 Our anomalous results are not likely to be a result of having players play both roles.  Conducting the same 
experiment at Georgia State University, we find only one-third willing to accept $1 or $2 (mean reservation price 
was $2.77).   The mean offer in this session was $4.17.  This session of 30 subjects had no culture in a majority or 
substantial minority:  16 males, 14 foreign subjects from 10 different nations, 5 Hispanic, 3 African-American, and 8 
White. 
11 The mean offer increases from $4.17 to $5 if one influential subject is removed.  We will discuss this influential 
observation (subject #33) in the next section. 
 
12 Results from a Jonckheere-Terpstra test (with exact p-values) indicate a significant difference in Hispanic 
Responder behavior across sessions (p=0.0015).  No such significant difference is found among Navajo Responders 
(p=0.2837).  The JT test is a nonparametric test for ordered differences (trend) among classes and is preferable in 
this context to tests of more general class differences (e.g., Kruskal-Wallis H test; Hollander and Wolfe, 1998). 
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proportion of their ethnic group in the session increases.  Again, the behavior on the part of 
Hispanics is more striking.  Thus Navajo are willing to accept low offers at much higher rates 
than most other subjects in previous Ultimatum Game experiments, whereas Hispanic acceptance 
rates are only unusually high when playing in an All-Hispanic group. 
Proposers 
Offers by both Hispanic and Navajo Proposers are in the range observed in earlier studies 
regardless of their proportion of the session: between 38% and about 50% of the $10.00 to be 
divided.  When playing with members of one’s own ethnic group, however, Navajos make 
significantly lower offers than Hispanics (significant at 1% level under both a Mann-Whitney 
and t-test).  In addition, Hispanics appear to persistently discriminate against the Navajo -- 
Hispanic offers appear to decline as their majority status diminishes – while Navajos appear to 
make higher offers when Hispanics are in the session.13
IV. Results – Regression Analyses 
The summary statistics in the previous section do not, of course, control for demographic 
variability among subjects or the differences in ethnic proportions across sessions.  There was a 
high degree of variability in our subject pool with, for example, ages ranging from 16 to 50 years 
old and annual incomes ranging from less than $5,000 to more than $50,000.  Such variability 
affected the demographic composition across sessions.  For example, among Hispanic subjects in 
the All-Hispanic session, the mean age was 32.3 years and 40% reported incomes less than 
$5000 per year.  For Hispanic subjects in the Majority-Navajo session, the mean age was 22.1 
years and 12.5% reported incomes less than $5000 per year.  Similar variability existed among 
Navajos across sessions.  As we wrote in Section II, some studies have found that demographic 
attributes are important determinants of behavior in the Ultimatum Game (Harbaugh et al., 2002; 
Botelho et al., 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Stanley and Tran, 1998; Carter 
and Irons, 1991; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler, 1986).14  To control for their effects, and to 
allow us to focus on our two major questions, we conduct regression analyses of Proposers’ 
13 Results from a Jonckheere-Terpstra test (with exact p-values) indicate significant differences in Proposer behavior 
across sessions for both the Navajos (p=0.0237) and Hispanics (p=0.0590). 
14 Although previous Ultimatum Game studies have not included marital status (probably because most of the 
subjects were young college students), 15% of our subject pool was married and we hypothesized that married 
subjects may behave differently in a bargaining situation 
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offers and Responders’ minimum acceptable offers (reservation prices) against the variables 
listed in Table 3. 
Hispanic ethnicity is the omitted ethnicity variable in the models.  Inter-ethnic effects are 
measured by the variables (2), (3), and (3.a) (3.a is used only in Offer regression).  The squared 
interaction term (3.a) between Navajo and percent of subjects in a session from a different ethnic 
group is included as a result of our finding a non-linear relationship between Navajo Proposer 
behavior and the ethnic composition of the session.15  As we will note, however, this non-
linearity is largely a result of the behavior of two subjects.  Such non-linearity was not observed 
among Hispanics. 
We also estimated a model in which behavioral variables (i.e., responses from questions 
in Figures 2 and 4) and expectations were included, but these regressions do not change the 
qualitative results of our analysis of cross-cultural and inter-cultural effects on decision-making 
(see Ferraro and Cummings, 2003, for other regressions).  Given evidence of heteroskedasticity, 
we use the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance (White, 1980), which produces robust 
estimates of the standard errors.16
 
Table 3. Variables Used In Regression Analyses 
    Variable       Description                            
Dependent variables: RESERV   Responder’s reservation price  
OFFER   Proposer’s offer    
Independent variables: 
1.   Navajo   Dummy variable = 1 if subject is Navajo   
2.   PercentOther  Percent of subjects in session from an ethnic group 
     different from that of the subject’s  [0%, 96.9%]  
3.   NavPercentOther  Interaction between (1) and (2)    
3.a (NavPercentOther)2  (3) squared, used only in Offer equation 
4.   Age   Subject’s age       
                                                          
15 We detected this non-linearity using Mallows (1986) augmented component-plus-residuals plot, a sensitive test of 
non-linearity. 
 
16 We also used Davidson and MacKinnon’s (1993) more conservative HC3 estimator without a substantial change 
in the standard errors.  All regressions were run in Stata v.7. 
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5.   Male   Dummy variable = 1 if subject is male   
6.   Econ   Number of economics courses taken by subject  
7.   Less$15000  Dummy variable = 1 if subject’s income is less 
 than $15,000   
8.   $15_$45000  Dummy variable = 1 if subject’s income is 
 between $15,000 and $45,000 
9.   NavLess$15000  Interaction term between (1) and (7) 
10. Nav$15-$45  Interaction term between (1) and (8) 
11. Married   Dummy variable = 1 if subject is married 
  
Results from the regressions of Responder behavior (RESERV) and Proposer behavior 
(OFFER) are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  These results will serve as a basis for responses to the 
two questions raised in Section 2: (1) Do we observed cross-cultural differences in Ultimatum 
Game behavior of subjects from these two cultures that share the same geographic area? and (2) 
Do changes in the proportional representation of an ethnic group substantially affect behavior in 
the Ultimatum Game?  We answer these questions by first examining the behavior of 
Responders, and then the behavior of Proposers. 
 
Responders 
With respect to cross-cultural effects, Navajos have significantly lower reservation 
prices, on average, than Hispanics (Table 4).  For example, the ethnicity coefficients suggest 
that, depending on income, a Navajo subject will accept, on average, between $0.35 - $2.80 less 
than a Hispanic subject.
With respect to our second question concerning inter-cultural effects, the behaviors of 
both Hispanic and Navajo Proposers are significantly affected by the ethnic composition of the 
session in both models.  Both Hispanics and Navajo discriminate against the other ethnic group 
in the sense that their mean reservation prices increase with an increase in the proportion of 
subjects from the other ethnic group; this effect is most pronounced with Hispanic subjects.  If, 
for example, the subject pool were 25% Hispanic and 75% Navajo, the model predicts that the 
average minimum acceptable offer of Hispanics would be about $1.44 more than if the pool were 
100% Hispanic. 
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With regard to the demographic variables, we observe that Hispanic reservation prices 
are significantly and positively related to income, whereas such a relationship was not observed 
for the Navajo (if anything, poorer Navajos demand a little more of the pie).  Married subjects, 
both Hispanic and Navajo, have significantly lower reservation prices than single subjects by 
almost $1 on average.  Evidence of gender effects on a Responder’s reservation price is weak, at 
best, with males requiring about $0.45 less than females on average.  A negative effect also 
derives from exposure to economics courses.17
Table 4.  Responder’s Reservation Price As Dependent Variable 
Model 1:  F(11,105)   = 10.27 (Prob>F=0.000)18;  R-squared = 0.24; Root MSE = 1.50              
                        Coefficient    t-statistic      
Independent Variable    (Standard Error)  (p-value)   
Constant                 4.165                5.20        
          (0.801)           (0.000)          
Navajo         -2.793     -4.35   
          (0.642)   (0.000)             
PercentOther         0.019      2.88   
         (0.007)   (0.005)        
NavPercentOther        -0.010     -0.77   
         (0.013)   (0.443)        
Age          0.011      0.64   
         (0.017)   (0.527)   
Male         -0.446     -1.53      
         (0.292)   (0.130)      
Econ         -0.079     -2.31        
         (0.032)   (0.023) 
Married         -0.969                -2.52   
         (0.385)   (0.013)    
Less$15,000        -2.355     -4.63   
         (0.509)   (0.000)   
$15-$45,000        -1.793     -3.94       
         (0.456)    (0.000)   
NavLess$15,000                2.445      3.20   
         (1.027)    (0.002)         
Nav$15-$45,000         1.970      2.35   
         (0.838)     (0.021)  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Removing one subject who reported taking 26 economics courses makes the coefficient smaller (-0.04) and 
insignificantly different from zero (p = 0.65). 
18 Values of “0.000” imply a value less than 0.001. 
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Proposers 
In terms of cross-cultural effects among Proposers, we find a significant difference in the 
behavior of our two cultural groups in both models (Table 5).  On average, Navajos offer less 
than Hispanics.  For example, the ethnicity coefficients suggest that, depending on income 
levels, a Navajo subject offers, on average, between $1.27 and $2.50 less than a Hispanic 
subject. 
In terms of our inter-cultural question -- does the ethnic mix of the session “matter” -- we 
find the ethnic composition of the session has significant effects on offers.  Hispanics make the 
highest offers to a Responder when all subjects are Hispanic, and persistently lower offers as the 
percent of Hispanics in the group decreases.  For example, a Hispanic subject offers, on average, 
$1 less if Hispanics make up only 25% of the session rather than 100%. 
Turning to Navajo Proposers, the non-linear response to ethnic composition that was 
evident in Table 1 is also reflected in our regression results:  mean Navajo offers rise and then 
fall as their proportional representation of the session decreases (reflected in the significantly 
positive sum of “PercentOther” and “NavPercentOther” and the significantly negative sign on 
“NavPercentOther2").  However, much of this non-linearity is driven by two influential 
observations.  Using Cook’s (1997) distance to identify influential observations, we identified 
two Navajo subjects who offered $0 as the two most influential observations (#29 in the All-
Navajo session; #33 in the Majority-Hispanic session).  Removing these observations from the 
data set removes the observed nonlinearity in the data:  the coefficient on NavPercentOther2 is 
statistically no different from zero.  Removing the two influential observations and the squared 
variable from the regression yields the following coefficients:  PercentOther = -0.015 (p=0.013) 
and NavPercentOther = 0.033 (p=0.006).  This result implies that Hispanic offers decrease 
linearly in the proportion of Navajo subjects in the session (almost 2 cents for every 1% increase 
in the proportion of Navajos), while Navajo offers increase linearly in the proportion of Hispanic 
subjects in the session (almost 2 cents for every 1% increase in the proportion of Hispanics). 
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Table 5.  Proposer’s Offer As Dependent Variable 
Model 1:  F(12,104) = 1.97 (Prob>F=0.034);  R-squared = 0.15; Root MSE = 1.56 
        
                        Coefficient    t-statistic      
Independent Variable    (Standard Error)  (p-value)   
Constant                 6.642                    7.27            
          (0.914)          (0.000)         
Navajo         -2.502     -2.17       
          (1.151)   (0.032)          
PercentOther        -0.013     -1.98      
         (0.007)   (0.050)     
NavPercentOther                0.107      3.18      
         (0.034)   (0.002)        
NavPercentOther2       -0.001     -2.75    
         (0.000)   (0.007)        
Age         -0.029     -1.54      
         (0.019)   (0.126)        
Male          0.092      0.29   
         (0.314)   (0.771)       
Econ          0.052      1.62           
         (0.032)   (0.109)        
Married               -0.245                   -0.55   
         (0.442)   (0.580)        
Less$15,000       -1.060     -2.26   
         (0.470)   (0.026)        
$15-$45,000        -0.689     -1.46     
         (0.472)    (0.147)  
NavLess$15,000                1.232      1.20  
         (1.027)    (0.233)       
Nav$15-$45,000                1.050      0.90   
         (1.170)     (0.372)        
 
Predicted Proposer and Responder Behavior 
In an effort to make clear the nature of these cross-cultural and inter-cultural effects, an 
example is given below in Table 6 where we consider two hypothetical subjects: a Navajo and a 
Hispanic subject, both 25 year-old single females with incomes in the $15,000-$45,000 range.  
For various ethnic mixes, Table 6 gives the Responder reservation prices and Proposer offers that 
are predicted by the regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5.  Because the non-linearity observed 
for Proposer Offers was driven by two influential observations, we drop these two observations 
and use a re-estimated Offer model without the squared term “NavPercentOther2” (from Ferraro 
and Cummings, 2003). 
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Table 6.   
Comparison of Hypothetical Navajo and Hispanic Subjects with Identical Attributes 
  Navajo Hispanic 
Percent of 
“other” ethnic 
group in session 
Minimum 
Acceptable 
Offer 
Offer Minimum 
Acceptable 
Offer 
Offer 
0% $1.19  $3.13  $2.14  $4.33  
20% $1.37  $3.46  $2.50  $3.95  
50% $1.63  $3.96  $3.03  $3.38  
80% $1.89  $4.45  $3.57  $2.81  
 
In the ethnically homogeneous sessions, reservation prices and offers are 
substantially different between the Navajo and Hispanic “subjects.”  Most importantly for 
our purpose, as the percent of Navajo subjects in a session increases, reservation prices 
increase and offers decrease for the Hispanic subject.  For the Navajo subject, increases 
in the percent of Hispanics in the session also results in increasing reservation prices; her 
offer, however, also increases as the percent of Hispanic subjects in a session increases. 
Statistical versus Preference-based Discrimination 
In another paper (Ferraro and Cummings, 2003), we analyze the reasons for the observed 
discrimination across sessions.  If rational agents have no information about the behavior of the 
partner with whom they are bargaining, but have information about the average behavior of the 
group to which the partner belongs (e.g., an ethnic group), they may condition their decision on 
the average behavior of the group to which the partner belongs.  Such behavior is called 
“statistical discrimination” (or “rational stereotyping”).  If, in contrast, a rational agent simply 
prefers to behave differently when paired with a bargaining partner of particular characteristics, 
such behavior is called “preference-based discrimination” (or “a taste for discrimination”).   The 
extent to which these two types of discrimination are empirically relevant in real world societies 
is controversial (Ladd, 1998).   
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Explaining the behavior of Responders as stemming from anything other than preference-
based discrimination is difficult (how would the average behavior of the Proposers affect what a 
Responder would be willing to accept?), but the behavior of Hispanic and Navajo Proposers 
could be explained as statistical discrimination because Navajos are generally more likely to 
accept low offers in mixed sessions.  Incorporating our data on subject expectations, however, 
lead us to conclude that although expectations do play a role, they cannot completely explain the 
behavior we observe.   A taste for discrimination against Navajo Responders by Navajo and 
Hispanic Proposers represent the strongest explanation for the observed Proposer behavior.   
A reader may find strange the conclusion that Navajos discriminate against Hispanics when they are 
Responders but against Navajos when they are Proposers.  Previous Ultimatum Game analyses, however, suggest 
that the framing of the Responder’s decision is different from the framing of the Proposer’s decision, and thus the 
operative decision variables are different.  In the former decision, issues associated with justice, fairness and equity 
are operative, but in the latter decision, strategic concerns and other-regarding preferences are operative.  We do not 
pretend to understand why these observed patterns of preference-based discrimination take place, but we note that 
the results are consistent across alternative model specifications. 
VI.   Simulated Societies 
Subjects in the experiment described above were only matched once at random.  What if 
these subjects in each session were matched repeatedly, as they would be in a larger society?  
How would members of the Navajo and Hispanic cultures fare in such simulated societies?  To 
explore this question, we take the subjects in each session and create ten thousand random 
matches (thus we are implicitly assuming no learning or updating of prior beliefs among our 
subjects).  We are able to randomly re-match subjects because we have each Responder’s 
decision for every dollar offer a Proposer can make in this game.  
We present the results from this simulation in Table 7.  For each simulated society, we 
present the average payoff to Proposers and Responders broken down by culture.  We also 
present the “agreement rate” for the society, which is the percentage of interactions that resulted 
in positive payoffs for the bargainers.  For example, the average payoff to Navajo Proposers in 
the All-Navajo simulated society was $4.15, while the average payoff to Navajo Responders was 
$3.41.  These payoffs are substantially lower than the payoffs to Hispanic Proposers ($4.95) and 
Responders (4.84) in the All-Hispanic society.   
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Thus the Hispanic bargainers in a culturally homogenous society were better able to 
extract the available surplus than the Navajo bargainers in a culturally homogenous society.   The 
differences stem from the larger agreement rate among Hispanic bargainers – Hispanic Proposers 
in the All-Hispanic society tend to make higher offers and Responders are willing to accept low 
offers.19  As indicated in the last two rows of the table, Navajo bargainers would do better in a 
mixed society with Hispanic members, but Hispanic members do best in a culturally 
homogenous society. 
Table 7.  Summary of Simulation Results        
 Average Proposer  Agreement          Average Responder  
                                             Payoff:               Rate: Payoff: 
        Society                                      Navajo     Hispanic     ___________    Navajo        Hispanic 
  All-Navajo    $4.15       -----   75.59%   $3.41  ------ 
  All-Hispanic    -----        $4.95  97.91%   -----  $4.84 
  Majority-Navajo   $4.60      $4.79 93.53%   $4.64  $4.82 
  Majority-Hispanic   $4.08      $4.37 85.50%   $4.01  $4.31 
 Do such simulations offer insights into current day behaviors and outcomes?  Without 
further experimentation, we cannot say. Our purpose here is to simply illustrate the way in which 
our experimental framework allows for simulations that can yield additional insights.  Using 
more elaborate experiments that better mimic natural resource allocation decisions, analysts can 
conduct informative simulations of how conflict may affect future natural resource bargaining 
across cultural groups.   
VII. Concluding Remarks 
In this study, we depart from traditional empirical investigations to provide a framework 
to advance our understanding of the way in which culture affects economic outcomes.  Our 
results clearly demonstrate that culture can matter in explaining variability in economic 
outcomes, and in more ways than previous research has suggested.  Hispanic and Navajo 
subjects not only behave differently in the Ultimatum Game, but they also respond differently to 
                                                          
19 In the All-Navajo session, there are also a few Responders who reject both low amounts and high amounts (called 
“non-monotonic” preferences and examined in Ferraro and Cummings (2003)). 
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the ethnic composition of the session.   
As noted in the Introduction, these results have implications of general interest to 
environmental policy makers.  Throughout the world, policies are formulated in societies 
characterized by mixed ethnicity, race and religion, in which there are clear majority and 
minority groups.  Allocating the costs and benefits of public decisions across citizens (e.g., 
setting user fees, providing public goods) is a crucial policy issue.  The way in which citizens 
value the potential policy outcomes, however, may not only be affected by the cultural group to 
which they belong, but also by the group’s relative size in the society.  The experimental 
approach we advocate can also shed light on current research programs analyzing endogenous 
preferences across different socio-cultural structures (Palacios-Huerta and Santos, 2004), and the 
role of cultural diversity in economic growth (Easterly and Levine; Alesina et al. 2003) and 
social policies towards the poor (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004). 
Furthermore, the results suggest that economists may need to reconsider the way in which 
they control for ethnicity in empirical analyses.  Economists traditionally use simple dummy 
(zero-one) variables for each ethnic group.  Twenty-five years ago, Thomas Schelling (1978: 
108) observed that “undoubtedly for some behaviors…it is proportions that influence people, not 
absolute numbers.”  Our results provide empirical support for Professor Schelling’s observation.  
The increased global relevance of diverse institutional arrangements for mediating the 
bargaining over natural resources (e.g., participatory resource management, community-based 
natural resource management, etc.) ensures that inter-cultural relationships will continue to have 
an impact on economic outcomes related to environmental resource for the foreseeable future.  
Economists cannot continue to sit on the sidelines.  We hope that our analysis has shed light on 
an initial path for economists to begin participating in this growing area of research. 
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